This book develops the ideas from John Gray's 2002 book Straw Dogs, although
there is no need to have read the earlier book in order to understand or
appreciate this book.
In Straw Dogs, Gray set out the notion that human beings
differ only from other animals in that they convince themselves that they are
superior beings destined to conquer the earth and rule over all other life
forms. In The Silence of Animals, he delves behind this conviction, looking at
the myth of human progress that supports our false hopes for ourselves - the
hope of reaching some kind of utopian salvation. A key thread in the book is
the religious nature of all movements and philosophies, with humanists coming
in for a particularly heavy going over - "humanists believe that humanity
improves along with the growth of knowledge, but the belief that the increase
of knowledge goes with advances in civilization is an act of faith" - and
atheists being asked to ask a much bigger question of themselves than those
they ask of belivers: if God does not exist, why do so many people feel a need
to have a faith in one? It is this idea of faith that Gray is really interested
in, and he brands humanism and atheism as "secular faiths" that take
humankind as their God, with the myths of progress as their testament.
The idea that we need a faith to soothe us through the
thorny discomforts of life is nothing new - Marx said in 1843 that religion is
the opium of the people - but what elevates this book to another plane is that
Gray dissects why human beings are so reliant on myths in order to give their
lives meaning - effectively reaching a conclusion that "a life without
myths is itself the stuff of myth" - and why we feel the need to give our
lives meaning at all. He quotes a plethora of poets, memoirists and thinkers
along the way (most commonly Wallace Stevens, Sigmund Freud and Friedrich
Nietzsche - although strangely Albert Camus does not get a mention, despite his The Myth of Sisyphus treading ground
very close to that which Gray passes over here), as he pushes toward the idea
that people "find meaning in the suffering that the struggle for happiness
brings", that we are "attached to nothing so much as this state of
happy misery".
From this idea he picks up Freud, asking why we need to pursue an idea of happiness - fundamentally reaching the conclusion that we do so in order to distract ourselves from our lives ("from the internal monologue that is the dubious privilege of human self-awareness") - and then asking why we cannot simply be happy to exist and experience life.
From this idea he picks up Freud, asking why we need to pursue an idea of happiness - fundamentally reaching the conclusion that we do so in order to distract ourselves from our lives ("from the internal monologue that is the dubious privilege of human self-awareness") - and then asking why we cannot simply be happy to exist and experience life.
The book then moves into its final part, where Gray joins
hands with Samuel Beckett to question the use of language (how it gets in the
way of our simply existing and experiencing life) and J.A. Baker, whose book The Peregrine saw him
attempt to understand the silent existence of a peregrine falcon. While animals
appear content simply to exist, the human's problem is the constant quest to
give meaning to existence - a meaning universally underpinned by the myth of
progress.
Gray asks us to essentially take a step back from existence,
to stop interfering with the world, to stop building false constructs within it
and our minds, to "look with eyes that are not covered with a film of
thought". It is thought, the one thing we think we have that makes us
superior to animals, that is in fact our undoing - we think ourselves to death,
or at least out of life.
Gray comes close to reaching the same conclusion in this
book ("Contemplation can be understood as an activity that aims not to
change the world or to understand it, but simply to let it be") as he did
in Straw Dogs ("Can we not think of the aim of life as being simply to
see?"), but he adds a final kicker in this book: "There is no
redemption from being human. But no redemption is needed."
In the context of the book, this rings an optimistic note - that humans can reach this point of not feeling the need for redemption - but the more realistic conclusion seems to be reached 10 pages before the end: “Man, much more than baboon or wolf, is an animal formed for conflict; his life seems meaningless to him without it.” After all, we attached to nothing so much as this state of happy misery.